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INDIAN-LAW SCHOLARSHIP AND TRIBAL SURVIVAL: A
SHORT ESSAY, PROMPTED BY A LONG FOOTNOTE
Robert Laurence*
Volume 34 of the Arizona State Law Journal contains the latest piece of
scholarship by Robert N. Clinton, who holds the Barry Goldwater Chair of
American Institutions at Arizona State University' That article's thesis is set
forth so plainly and unambiguously in its straightforward, uncolonated title -
"There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes" - that there is
little need to give a synopsis here, beyond this: Professor Clinton sets out to
prove that Congress lacks constitutional authority to impose its, or the
nation's, will on American Indian tribes. From the conclusion:
The short version of this lengthy exegesis on the illegitimacy of
the federal Indian plenary power doctrine and the lack of federal
supremacy over Indian tribes is simply that the emperor has no
clothes! It is high time legal scholarship routinely speaks truth to
power in the hope that constitutional scholars, lawyers, and judges
will conclude finally that what Congress and the Supreme Court
have long claimed as a legitimate federal plenary power over
Indian tribes, in fact, simply has no constitutional textual or
original historical basis. The federal Indian plenary power doctrine
is nothing more than a raw assertion of naked colonial power
ostensibly cloaked with an aura of constitutional legitimacy by
mere judicialfiat.2
Professor Clinton's article is what we have come to expect from one of the
handful of people who can legitimately claim to be the leading Indian-law
scholars of the last quarter of the twentieth century. It is massive; it is
original; it is constitutionally precise; it is historically astute. And, it could be
expected to provoke a response from me, the famous defender of the plenary
power of Congress, at least to the extent that saying that I can "live with" the
plenary power was a defense of it, which it was not.3
* Robert A. Leflar Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 113 (2002). Volume 34, No. I of the Arizona State Law Journal contains the
proceedings of a Symposium on "Cultural Sovereignty: Native Rights in the 21st Century."
2. Id. at 259.
3. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
However, the present short essay is not that response. I had my say on the
plenary power years ago, for which I received no particular outpouring of
friendly scholarly support. Truth be told, I can still live with the plenary
power of Congress over the Indian nations,4 but for present purposes that is
neither here nor there. You will find here no careful critique of There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes. I have negotiated that limb
before and see no need to venture out there again now. If a reader wishes to
conclude that the absence of that critique means that I find nothing
particularly objectionable in Professor Clinton's treatment, I will not protest.
Herein, I intend to be brief, and set forth some thoughts prompted by
exactly one footnote in There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, footnote 458, the first paragraph of which is set forth here in full:
After hearing a necessarily abbreviated oral presentation of
portions of this article, Philip S. Deloria, the Director of the
American Indian Law Center, Inc., rightly cautioned the author that
if tribal leaders irresponsibly flaunt federal law in response to the
author's legal theories, it could make life far worse for many Indian
communities, whose socioeconomic data already places them at the
bottom of most material and health measures of American society.
These perceptive comments suggest that, whatever the original
constitutional theory of federal power with respect to Indian tribes
and irrespective of the nature of the relationship developed when
treaties were negotiated, the model of the tribal-federal relations in
fact has been a historically evolutionary one in which Indian tribes
increasingly have become enmeshed with, controlled by, and
economically dependent upon the federal government. Whatever
its theoretical constitutional legitimacy, that practical reality
clearly suggests that tribal leaders and tribal judges must be
extremely cautious in exercising the powers they legitimately can
claim.5
Indian Nations, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 413 (1988).
4. l am with the vast majority of scholars in finding the sweeping plenary power the courts
have created for themselves under the federal common law to be difficult to abide. See Robert
Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, As Opposed to
Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D.
L. REv. 393 (1995).




The second paragraph of footnote 458 cites to the famous debate between
me and Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. of the University of Arizona College
of Law over the fact and the legitimacy of the plenary power,' and concludes
with this thought by Professor Clinton: "The mere fact that tribes often may
have little practical choice but to accept exercises of federal plenary power
does not necessarily constitutionally legitimate the use of that power by the
federal government. This essay primarily addresses that latter question."7
For those eager for controversy, for those anticipating with some relish a
theoretical cat-fight between old friends and grey-bearded scholars, let me
note at the outset that the present essay will not be that, nor will it even be a
particularly sharp critique of Professor Clinton's footnote 458. As my title sets
forth, I was merely "prompted" in the present direction by that note, which
raises, I think, important questions concerning the relationship between
Indian-law scholarship and tribal survival. To Professor Clinton's credit, he
has set forth Sam Deloria's criticism for all readers to see, when he might have
chosen not to memorialize it in a footnote, and those not in attendance at the
meeting mentioned would have never known of the exchange, and I would not
have been prompted to join the debate, on Sam Deloria's side, as you will soon
see.
8
So the fact that Professor Clinton's footnote 458 prompted the present short
essay does not mean that I want to hold him up for special criticism, though
6. My offering in this debate is cited in note 3 supra. Professor Williams' is Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WiS. L. REv. 219. We exchanged
responses beginning at 30 ARIz. L. REv. 439 (1988).
7. Clinton, supra note 1, at 245 n.458. Footnote 458 is subtended to the first sentence of
a two-paragraph "important cautionary practical note" that is largely duplicative of the sentence
quoted in the text at supra note 5, beginning with the words "[w]hatever its theoretical
constitutional legitimacy...." These two paragraphs, together with footnote 458, have a tacked-
on feeling, and one suspects that Professor Clinton's article was largely complete at the time of
the oral presentation to which Sam Deloria reacted, and the caution urged by the latter became
the former's cautionary practical note on pages 245-46 of the article's text. As I find the footnote
more succinct and its attribution to Sam Deloria appropriate, I will concentrate here on the
margin, not the text.
8. Mr. Deloria, himself, contributed to the symposium issue that includes Professor
Clinton's article. See Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian
Nations, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 55 (2002). That article, which is the written rendition of a speech,
explores a broad range of issues and reacts to the views of several other participants in the
symposium, and is entirely consistent with the comments related to us by Professor Clinton in
his footnote 458. My comments here are on those latter thoughts alone, and I will not be
analyzing Mr. Deloria's thought-provoking speech qua essay.
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I will characterize There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes
as an unusually good example of the kind of scholarship that might pose a
threat to tribal survival in the twenty-first century. Many other law professors
have suffered the criticism attributed to Mr. Deloria in footnote 458, and there
is no need to exclude the present writer from that list. Nor is Mr. Deloria the
only one who offers such criticism. Nor is such criticism always made
publicly; as some of us know, a private comment can be withering.
Thus, with the thought firmly held by writer and readers alike that "There,
but for the Grace of God, go I," I make the following observations, prompted
by 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 245, n. 458:
1. We have more influence over tribal decision makers when we are
talking to them than when we write in our scholarly journals.
The publication of Indian-law scholarship has expanded greatly in the last
quarter century. 9 How could I, a man of many words myself, find this
expansion to be anything but laudable? And it is, if for no reason greater than
that it shows that professors whose subject is ours are writing and getting
tenure for doing so. But let's be honest: there is no good evidence that
scholarly writing in the law reviews has any regular influence on the way that
tribal decision makers make their decisions.'"
It is one of the odd facts of the scholarly world we inhabit that we Indian-
law scholars spend more of our time talking to nonlawyers than do scholars
in most other fields. For one thing, many tribal judges and tribal-court
advocates are not law-trained, yet they attend many meetings that might
otherwise be characterized as "continuing legal education." Hence, nonlawyer
9. Here is a very unscientific measure of that expansion: The Index to Legal Periodicals
for the time period September 1980 through August 1981 contains forty entries under "Indians."
The same index for the time period September 2000 through August 2001 contains 140 entries
under two categories, "Indians" and "Indigenous Peoples." As some of these entries are
duplicates, these numbers do not precisely count the number of published articles, but they do
make the trend clear.
10. This observation leaves aside for the present the question of whether the evidence is
good or not that scholarly writing in the law reviews influences courts and, if so, in which ways.
While it is surely true that most of the modem scholarship mentioned in the previous footnote
may generally be characterized as "tribal advocacy," the same period of time has exhibited a
general erosion of the concept of tribal sovereignty as recognized by the courts. How sad it was
to see Dean Newton's fine scholarship on the workings of tribal courts cited by Justices Souter,
Kennedy, and Thomas as part of their reason for concurring in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001). See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian





tribal decision makers attend meetings where the speakers are commonly
lawyers and law professors. The annual Indian Law Conference, sponsored
by the Federal Bar Association, is only the best example of this phenomenon,
but it is far from unique.
It takes no empirical study to convince me that it is when I stand at the
lectern at such meetings, and when I engage in informal discussions in the
surrounding hallways, that I am able to be most persuasive regarding my
theoretical positions to these nonlawyer tribal decision makers. On the other
hand, most theoretical essays in most law reviews have a very limited
readership, and one that is made up mostly of writers of similar theoretical
essays. I don't expect most tribal decision makers to read seventy-three pages
of Indian law cum modem physics in the Arizona Law Review" and, frankly,
they're not my audience when I'm writing theoretical pieces like that one, or
this one. My influence comes when I'm talking to a small group of tribal
officials about conflicts of interest in very small tribes, and the fact that the
article mentioned dubs these conflicts as examples of "scalar asymmetry" is
largely irrelevant to that influence. As a matter of fact, I concede that calling
them "scalar asymmetries" can actually get in the way of convincing tribal
decision makers that I know what I'm talking about or that anything I know
should be relevant to what they do in their tribal offices.
So, I take these observations to be nearly self-evident: that we Indian-law
scholars have direct access to tribal decision-making processes that makes our
field special, if not unique, and that this access is more - much more -
effective and real when we are speaking at Indian-law conferences than when
we are writing for the law reviews.
It is equally self-evident to me that most of us believe in the importance of
tribal survival to the very core of our scholarly selves.
What is missing, in my view, prompted as I have been by Professor
Clinton's footnote 458, is the link between these self-evident truths. Indeed,
the linkage itself may be less evident than the truths being linked, but we are
lucky enough to have around us Sam Deloria, and those like him, nonscholars
in the traditional sense perhaps, but those who have fought and are fighting the
very real, nontheoretical battles for tribal survival every day, on the ground,
in tribal council chambers, in tribal attorney generals' offices, and in tribal
education-contracting departments. Mr. Deloria's comment upon hearing
Professor Clinton's talk, related to us in footnote 458, was a reminder to the
theorist, and through him to all theorists, that he was talking, right then, to
11. The reference is to Robert Laurence, Symmetry andAsymmetry in Federal Indian Law,
42 ARIz. L. REv. 861 (2000).
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tribal leaders, and the impact of his theoretical thesis would never, ever, be
greater on those leadersthan it was right then, when the audience was live and
the words were spoken. Such a reminder can be dramatic, as, reading between
the lines, it may have been during the Clinton-Deloria exchange related in the
footnote. (I wasn't there.) One is reminded of the occasion in the film The
Bridge on the River Kwai when Colonel Nicholson realizes that his theories
regarding the maintenance of prison camp morale were about to result in the
easy transportation of the enemy's troops across the bridge. "Oh my God.
What have I done?" Whether Professor Clinton suffered such an epiphany I
do not know, but I would have.
2. "Necessarily abbreviated oral presentations" of scholarly matters
are likely to be misleading.
It occurs to me that Professor Clinton concedes a good part of Mr. Deloria's
point when he writes, a little defensively to my ear, that his co-panelist had
heard only "a necessarily abbreviated oral presentation of portions of this
article."'" It goes without saying, doesn't it?, that a theorist's oral presentation
of his or her scholarly thesis will often be "necessarily abbreviated." Does
that mean, in turn, that theorists should never speak about their work, but only
write? Surely not. There are important occasions to share one's thoughts that
necessarily require abbreviation of those thoughts.
However, Mr. Deloria's point flows to here from the prior observation. It
is specially, if not uniquely, the case that Indian-law theorists find themselves
talking to tribal decision makers, rather than merely other theorists. And this
talk is not in the abstract; the tribal decision makers are attending the
conference not to theorize, but to get ideas about how to do theirjobs. If the
oral presentation of a Indian-law scholar's theories to an audience of tribal
decision makers is necessarily abbreviated and, as such, potentially
misleading, then those misled are the persons making the day-to-day decisions
on which tribal existence depends.
I have emphasized alreadythat the position Professor Clinton found himself
in, and about which footnote 458 is written, is not an unusual one for Indian-
law theorists. However, the thesis of his Arizona State Law Journal article is
especially susceptible to the dangers of which Sam Deloria warns. There Is
No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes sets out the theoretical
foundation for a tribe to deny the legitimacy of federal power over it.'3 "The
12. Clinton, supra note 1, at 245 n.458.
13. Professor Porter's article in the same issue of the Arizona State Law Journal is of the




federal Indian plenary power doctrine is nothing more than a raw assertion of
naked colonial power ostensibly cloaked with an aura of constitutional
legitimacy by mere judicial fiat."'4  Stated orally, and in necessarily
abbreviated form, to an audience partly made up of tribal decision makers, the
message given and perhaps received is that the decision makers and their
tribes can tell the federal government to butt out, to stuff its directives or
contracting requirements, to "irresponsibly flaunt federal law," in Professor
Clinton's more formal words.' 5
Sam Deloria's reproof, then, goes like this: Oral presentations are
necessarily abbreviated and, without great care, necessarily misleading. When
the listeners are nonlawyer tribal decision makers, such misleadings can have
real impacts on the ways tribes do business, and when the message is that the
federal government is without power over tribes, the consequences may
threaten in real ways the survival of the tribe.
3. Tribal leaders are unlikely to read the entire article.
Professor Clinton apparently concedes the point of Sam Deloria's reproof,
for he has included footnote 458, and the "cautionary note" in the text of
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, urging tribal leaders
not to react "irresponsibly" based on his scholarship. But, does the concession
of the point fix the problem? I think not.
Tribal decision makers are not like our co-theorists, and, as set out in
Observation 1 above, they do not attend our scholarly discussions for the same
reasons that other scholars, or practicing lawyers, attend them. All of us are
comfortable referring friendly- or, for that matter, unfriendly - co-theorists
to the article where our thoughts are set out more fully, unabbreviated, and
L.J. 76 (2002). Professor Porter writes: "At a minimum then, scholars who write about the
[Supreme] Court's Indian law decisions as ifthey were legitimate contribute to the elevation of
American, rather than Indigenous, conceptions of Indigenous nation sovereignty." Id. at 98.
This sentence is quite similar in its import to Professor Clinton's sentence, quoted in the text
above at footnote 2, beginning with the words "It is high time .. .
14. Clinton, supra note 1, at 259.
15. Id. at 245 n.458. The meaning of what would, or would not, be "responsible" is shown
in the paragraph in the text following the one to which footnote 458 is subtended: "Tribal
governments, leaders and judges must exercise tribal sovereignty responsibly in ways that both
foster the social, economic, and political welfare of tribal members and facilitate the
intergovernmental cooperation on which tribal well-being often depends." Id. at 246.
The word "irresponsibly" is a little presumptuous for my tastes; "ill-advised" might be better.
Nonetheless, I suspect that Professor Clinton and I would agree on the broad outlines of what
would be the kind of actions and positions we would urge against. Professor Porter is of a
different mind. See infra note 17.
No. 2]
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straight. Speaking about them is a common and acceptable way of abstracting
our theories for manageable discussion, and it is not too much to expect a
fellow scholar to read 147 pages in the Arizona State Law Journal.
However, regarding the common incompleteness of "necessarily abbrevi-
ated oral presentations" to tribal decision makers, it is no answer to Sam
Deloria, nor is it to me, to say, "well, if they'd just read the complete text then
they'd get the correct message." They won't, and they don't.
Do I engage here in the unfair stereotyping of tribal decision makers as
people unwilling - or worse, incapable - of reading 147 pages in the
Arizona State Law Journal? No. Putting aside again the question of who
exactly does read the theoretical lead articles in our better law reviews, I
certainly will not take to task the tribal decision maker who finds that he or
she has better things to do with time that is inherently limited. I don't believe
that such articles - including, incidentally, this one - are written with an
audience of tribal decision makers in mind, and if we don't write for them,
why should we be surprised if they don't read them? The most effective way
to communicate with the people who manage the practical concerns of tribal
survival is to talk to them, and to answer their questions. As I've mentioned,
we Indian-law theorists are granted extraordinary access to those occasions.
Publishing careful theoretical scholarship has its own virtues and gives rise to
its own odd pleasures, but it's not the way to change the day-to-day operation
of a tribal budget office, if that is what one is trying to do.
Thus do we come to the essential quandary of the theoretician speaking to
an audience of nontheoreticians: Oral presentations, as Professor Clinton
correctly notes, are "necessarily abbreviated," which abbreviation will likely
lead to oversimplification, incompleteness, and misleadingness, difficulties
usually cured by reference to the published article. But the complete
theoretical discussion as published will not be read by the nontheoreticians,
so the mislead stays in place. Add to this the dramatic nature of the thesis of
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, and one arrives at
Sam Deloria's rebuke to Professor Clinton, reported in footnote 458.
And the response is?
4. A footnote is no cure.
Given this quandary, there is something profoundly ironic, and almost a
caricature of academia, lying in footnote 458, as well as the two-paragraph
"important cautionary practical note" to which it is subtended. Only a scholar
would turn to the footnote as a cure, 6 and a more ineffective cure cannot be




imagined: "You told the Assistant Secretary to get the hell off the
reservation? Didn't you read 34 Ariz. St. LJ 113, 245, n.458?! You tribal
decision makers are going to be the death of me." 7
I can only presume that Sam Deloria never read footnote 458 in
Albuquerque; that rebuke I could have heard by opening my window here in
Fayetteville.
5. "Speak truth to power" is advice more easily given than followed
Professor Clinton in There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes twice uses the admonition to "speak truth to power." One admonition
comes in the conclusion and is addressed to his fellow theorists; I have quoted
that passage above, at the outset.'8
The other time the admonition appears it is directed not to us theorists, but
to tribal leaders, and is part of the "impprtant cautionary practical note" to
which footnote 458 is subtended:
The international human rights movement often employs the
slogan "speaking truth to power." [Footnote omitted.] This essay
constitutes an effort to accomplish precisely that result. There is,
however, a difference between "speaking truth to power" and
acting recklessly. Any tribe must pick its battles cautiously. Part
footnotes in the present essay; I am as fond of them as anyone. Now, I take it, you understand
the reason for my present marginal restraint.
17. Professor Porter's article advances the position that the Assistant Secretary of the
Interior ought to be told to get off the reservation, and that Indian law scholars are complicit in
the destruction of tribal societies if we urge otherwise. See. e.g., Porter, supra note 13, at 100.
Thus can we measure the distance between the principals: Professor Porter wants tribal leaders
to act in ways that Professor Clinton would call "irresponsible." So large is that distance that
it seems hardly important to note that the distance between Professor Porter and me is somewhat
larger. The distance between Mr. Deloria and Professor Porter is incalculable.
I find it difficult to respond to Professor Porter's off-the-chart theories; I react similarly to
the arguments of tax protestors and other extreme libertarians who refuse to concede to the
legitimacy of the government's authority over them. See, e.g., United States v. Ambort, 193
F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 1999); Turner v. Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Ala. 1975) and In re
Daly, 189 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1971). It's not that they're wrong, exactly, but that they are
grounded in such an entirely different world view from mine that it's hard to find the point at
which to begin the debate.
Professor Porter, incidentally, would probably reject my comparison of his position to that
of the tax protestors, because he thinks libertarians claiming a "sovereignty of the person" are
selfish and that only Indian tribes may legitimately find illegitimate the application of
government regulations to them. See Porter, supra note 13, at 106-07.
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
No. 21
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of that caution must involve full consciousness of the risks, the
costs, and the chances of success. 9
Professor Clinton then cites the example of the man who faced down the tank
in Tianamen Square, ending with the thought that: "Any tribe seeking to speak
truth to power must assure that its actions do not result in the tribe being
crushed under the metaphorical weight of federal tanks."2 °
Sam Deloria's comments, set forth in footnote 458, can be seen as a
reminder to scholars to treat very, very differently these two admonitions. For
Professor Clinton to remind us theorists, in general, and me, in particular, to
"speak truth to power" is merely to raise again the question of whether it is a
legitimate position for a scholar to "live with" the plenary power, as opposed
to speaking the theoretical truth about it. That is precisely the debate that I do
not intend to revisit here, but no one, including me, would think that Professor
Clinton somehow acts improperly when he reminds me to get with it. In fact,
I can always use the reminder, and I scanned There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause with interest.
But the admonition to "speak truth to power" has a very different sense
when it is directed to tribal decision makers, not fellow theorists. It is too
easy, Sam Deloria seems to be saying, for us theorists to sit in our plush, or
not, offices, with our life-tenured jobs, and advise the leaders of tribes of
which we are not members to stand up to the Assistant Secretary or the
Attorney General, or some GS-13 BIA bureaucrat and tell him, her, or them
that the United States has no legitimate power over the tribe. To abuse
Professor Clinton's metaphor, it can be like standing safely aside while urging
the man in Tianamen Square to stand up to the tank. We're not the ones who
are going to be crushed if the protest fails.
Spurred, I believe, by Sam Deloria's rebuke, Professor Clinton stuck his
"important cautionary practical note" on the 132nd and 133rd pages of his
article. It helps, for it states an important message that Professor Porter, for
instance, rejects. But it doesn't help enough. The Delorian rebuke, after all,
applies much more to the "necessarily abbreviated oral presentation," than it
does to the published article, which, under the observations set out above, will
not be read by those who were misled by the abbreviation, or potentially so.
The true and decisive cautionary note should be addressed to us as theorists:






I come, at the end of this short essay, to another aspect of Indian-law
scholarship- indeed of Indian law itself- that may fairly be called unique:
As this essay's title indicates, I believe Indian-law scholarship concerns itself
with the survival of the tribes. I am writing about tribal survival right here,
right now; Professor Clinton was writing about tribal survival in There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes; Professor Porter was writing
about tribal survival in The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty,
though perhaps he would define "survival" differently from the rest of us.2
Sam Deloria was talking about tribal survival at the conference reported in
footnote 458, and he talks about it every day at the American Indian Law
Center in Albuquerque. We are not commercial-law theorists talking to a
bunch of bankers' lawyers about the theories of insolvency, which, as a matter
of fact, is exactly what I do with the other half of my scholarly life. And
banks are worthy-enough institutions for whose demise I do not wish. But
when I am talking and writing about commercial law, it does not occur to me
that I am talking about the survival of the banking industry. That work is
mundane, and thankfully so.
But, as Indian-law scholars we are saved from such mundaneness. Tribes
as governments are fragile, made so by centuries of mostly European
aggression, some of which meets the modern definition of genocide. While
it might appear short-sighted to anticipate the coming demise of governments
that have survived so long and endured so much, most of us write Indian-law
scholarship with it very much in mind that we write to preserve the tribes. We
may disagree on the "how?," but we are pretty much together on the "what?,"
and the "why?."
All of this, then, works together and raised Sam Deloria's ire, as reported
in footnote 458. We are Indian-law theorists and are paid well to be such.
Our theories bear upon tribal survival. We are listened to by tribal decision
makers, often in contexts where our theories, convoluted or tidy, may not be
fully set forth. Within those contexts, our influence is great, partly because
many in the audience are not lawyers, and partly because they are the ones
who make the real decisions about the way tribes govern. And it is not
21. Professor Porter anticipates a renewed attempt by the United States to terminate the
tribes that lie within its borders and seeks to ensure that tribes will, in some form, survive this
termination. See Porter, supra note 13, at 105. Most of us would choose to advance the
likelihood oftribal survival by working against the return ofthe failed policy of termination, but
to Professor Porter, "making new investments of our human capital and financial resources into
lobbying the Congress, advocating before the Supreme Court or trying to 'change the system
from within,' is most likely a wasted effort in the long-run." Id. at I11.
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reasonable to expect that those listeners will always, or even often, become
readers of the law reviews where our theories are set out in full.
The solution to the Delorian quandary is not, I believe, to stop writing, as
the present essay proves as well as anything. Nor to add cautionary footnotes
here and there in our written work. Nor to stop speaking with and to tribal
decision makers. Nor to withhold our theories from them, nor to dumb them
down. The solution is this: to understand the colossal influence that we are
granted as Indian-law scholars, to appreciate the special efficacy that prevails
when we speak to tribal decision makers, either face-to-face or at Indian-law
conferences, to realize the practical impact that our thoughts can and do have
on tribal survival, and to beware at every instant of how a "necessarily
abbreviated oral presentation" of a theory that appears so thoughtful in print
may have disastrous consequences in the hands of those who will never read
the footnotes.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss2/4
